Deterrence in the Strait has long rested on Beijing’s inability to challenge by force the political separation between mainland China and Taiwan. The rapid modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), combined with the intensification of its manoeuvres around the island, now presents Taiwan and the United States with increasingly difficult trade-offs, whilst pushing them to strengthen their own defence capabilities. China is currently employing several tactics:
- regular air and naval pressure;
- preparation of a quarantine or blockade capability around the island;
- development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to deter US intervention.
In this context, military exercises – which are becoming increasingly frequent and large-scale – serve several purposes: to challenge Taipei’s sovereignty, to increase the logistical strain on Taiwanese forces, to gather intelligence, and to accustom the Taiwanese population to a high level of tension, all without provoking an explicit casus belli. These grey-zone operations allow Beijing to gradually shift the status quo in its favour, through an accumulation of faits accomplis and a gradual encirclement of Taiwan.
However, from a more strategic perspective, Beijing cannot afford a failed or protracted operation against Taiwan. This would indeed jeopardise the regime’s stability, causing a major economic shock and risking regional escalation.
Another factor that does not point to an attempt at direct invasion is the recent purges within the PLA. This suggests that the army may not be deemed fully ready for a major engagement, but also reflects a desire for continuous preparation and the alignment of chains of loyalty that might hinder or challenge Xi Jinping’s directives on Taiwan.
China’s military build-up does not, therefore, mean that conflict is inevitable, but Beijing is seeking to create a sense of inevitability in order to secure political gains without resorting to force.