The shift in the balance of power in the Strait can be seen, in particular, through the prism of missile threats and missile defence, a key aspect of the current security balance. China has developed a long-range strike capability, both conventional and nuclear, which is profoundly transforming the balance of power in the Strait and challenging US military dominance in the region.
The doctrinal shift can be traced to the late 1990s and early 2000s, when China’s defence strategy was rebuilt around Taiwan as a defining issue, against a backdrop of a sense of powerlessness in the face of US military superiority in the region. China is therefore seeking to acquire the means to manage escalation in a flexible and gradual manner, relying heavily on new conventional and nuclear precision strike capabilities.
It was during this period that the doctrinal foundations underpinning China’s precision strike capability were redeveloped: the conceptualisation of precision strikes as a decisive asymmetric capability; the notions of a window of opportunity and the targeting of strategic objectives; and the further development of ‘strategic deterrence’ based on a variety of means, including, indeed, primarily, conventional ones.
The objective is twofold:
- In Taiwan, to enable political and military decapitation strikes, as well as strikes on strategic infrastructure (air bases, ports, missile defences, energy infrastructure) to open the theatre to further operations;
- With regard to the United States, to establish a foundation of local superiority enabling the exercise of graduated pressure and the thwarting of American intervention, notably through an access denial strategy (strikes on US bases in Guam, Japan or South Korea, and on enemy naval capabilities).
Diversification, modernisation, massification and dualisation of resources
Four major trends can be identified in the development of China’s strike capabilities: diversification, modernisation, mass production and dual use.
Diversification:
- within the Rocket Force, diversification of ballistic (short, medium and intermediate range) and cruise missile capabilities, with variants adapted to specific missions (bunker penetration, submunitions, anti-ship strikes, etc.);
- across the different services, with the acquisition of deep-strike capabilities by forces that previously lacked them, such as the Army – with the PHL-16 multiple rocket launcher, designed for the strait and capable of saturating enemy defences at low cost.
Modernisation:
- equipping ballistic missiles with manoeuvring capabilities enabling, amongst other things, the evasion of defences and the striking of moving targets;
- improved accuracy;
- development of a support ecosystem (intelligence, surveillance, targeting), with a rapidly expanding space segment: China’s space-based observation capabilities offer high-resolution revisit rates.
Massification:
- rapid expansion of stockpiles, with an estimated 50% increase in the total number of missiles held by the Missile Forces over four years, and a fleet of nearly 2,000 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Dual-capability:
- Growth in the size of the nuclear arsenal (the number of nuclear warheads has risen from 290 in 2019 to 600 in 2025);
- The growing capability of dual-capability units and delivery systems (conventional and nuclear), which considerably complicates the adversary’s calculations.
Taken together, these developments threaten to undermine US dominance in the theatre, giving Beijing the capacity to inflict substantial damage, manage escalation with greater finesse, and lend greater credibility to the use of nuclear weapons in relation to the Taiwan issue. China’s long-range precision strike capabilities also constitute one of the main threats to Taipei.