From the American perspective, the geopolitical tradition emphasises control of the Eurasian coastline to prevent the rise of a continental power capable of gaining unhindered access to the oceans and major sea lanes. From this perspective, China is seen as the main adversary, whilst Russia is viewed more as a threat that facilitates China’s manoeuvres towards the seas.
Taiwan occupies a central position in this framework: for many American strategists, the loss of the island would be a major disaster for US interests in Asia, a key region in economic and trade terms. Since 2020, Washington has shown signs of moving away from its traditional strategic ambiguity, with statements following those of former President Joseph Biden regarding the willingness to ‘fight and win’ should deterrence fail in the strait.
However, this clarification remains relative: US commitment remains conditional on costs and risks deemed ‘reasonable’ for the United States, and Taiwan is not officially presented as an existential issue. Against a backdrop of a deteriorating balance of power, the credibility of US support appears increasingly dependent on the assessment of Taipei’s defensive choices, both militarily and politically.
Ambiguities under Trump and internal constraints in Taiwan
Efforts to strengthen Taiwan’s defence are hampered by internal political divisions, illustrated in particular by the KMT-TPP alliance’s blocking of the special defence budget in Parliament. Washington’s stance towards Taiwan is also shaped by the unpredictability of the Trump presidency, and by the uncertain influence of the Pentagon’s strategic circles on his decisions.
The recent US intervention in Iran’s conflicts with doctrines advocating a focus on Asia and has fuelled questions about the United States’ actual ability to sustain its efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, aside from this situation, the United States is already facing capacity constraints, which explain the redeployment of US systems from Asia to the Middle East. These developments are also fuelling concerns in Taiwan regarding the delivery of certain equipment scheduled for 2026 (Patriot systems, drones).
For Taipei, this results in persistent ambiguity between President Trump, who is difficult to predict, and a strategic community in Washington that is more realistic but whose support is increasingly conditional. Beijing will obviously seek to exploit these uncertainties.